Guam v. United States, 593 U.S. ___ (2021) (2024)

NOTICE: This opinion is subject toformal revision before publication in the preliminary print of theUnited States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporterof Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington,D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, inorder that corrections may be made before the preliminary printgoes to press.SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES_________________No. 20–382_________________TERRITORY OF GUAM, PETITIONER v. UNITEDSTATESon writ of certiorari to the united statescourt of appeals for the district of columbia circuit[May 24, 2021]Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of theCourt.The Comprehensive Environmental Response,Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, commonly known as CERCLA,establishes a complex statutory scheme for responding to certainenvironmental hazards. 94Stat. 2767, as amended, 42U.S.C. §9601 etseq. Several of itsprovisions address what is often the crucial question in a remedialaction: Who pays?Today’s case involves §113(f)(3)(B) of theAct,[1] which allows “[a]person who has resolved its liability to the United States or aState” in a settlement to seek “contribution”—that is, money fromanother responsible individual. The question is whether a partymust resolve a CERCLA-specific liability in order to trigger thisright, or whether a broader array of settlements involvingenvironmental liability will do. We hold that CERCLA contributionrequires resolution of a CERCLA-specific liability.IGuam and the United States are engaged in along-running dispute over the Ordot Dump, a “‘280-footmountain of trash’” near the center of the island. 950 F.3d104, 109 (CADC 2020). The Navy constructed the dump in the 1940s,and then allegedly deposited toxic military waste there for severaldecades. The United States later ceded control of the site to Guam,which itself used the dump as a public landfill. But that did notend the Federal Government’s involvement. In the late 20th century,the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) determined that the dumpposed an ecological hazard. After Guam allegedly failed to complywith agency directives to remediate the site, the EPA sued underthe Clean Water Act, asserting that Guam was “‘dischargingpollutants ... into waters of the United States withoutobtaining a permit.’” Ibid.That litigation ended in 2004, when Guam and theEPA entered into a consent decree. The decree required Guam, amongother things, to pay a civil penalty and to close and cover thedump. Guam’s compliance would, in turn, be “in full settlement andsatisfaction of the civil judicial claims of the United States... as alleged in the Complaint”—that is, claims underthe Clean Water Act. Id., at 116. But Guam was notcompletely free. As the agreement explained, “the United Statesd[id] not waive any rights or remedies available to it for anyviolation by the Government of Guam of federal and territorial lawsand regulations,” “[e]xcept as specifically provided [i]n [thedecree].” App. to Pet. for Cert. 166a.Thirteen years later, it was Guam’s turn tosue—this time under CERCLA. According to Guam’s complaint, theUnited States’ earlier use of the dump exposed it to liability ontwo fronts. The first was a cost-recovery action under §107(a),which allows a State (or here, a Territory), to recover “all costsof [a] removal or remedial action” from “any person who at the timeof disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated anyfacility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of.” Seealso §101(27). The second was a §113(f) “contribution”action. Under that provision, a “person who has resolved itsliability to the United States ... for some or all of aresponse action or for some or all of the costs of such action in[a] settlement may seek contribution from any person who isnot [already] party to a [qualifying] settlement.”§113(f)(3)(B).Rather than increase Guam’s odds of recovery,however, the second legal theory led to the dismissal of itscomplaint. According to the D.C. Circuit, if a partycan assert a contribution claim under §113(f), itcannot assert a cost-recovery claim under §107(a). See 950F.3d, at 111. The court then determined that Guam possessed acontribution claim—at least at one point—because the remedialmeasures and conditional release in the Clean Water Act decreesufficiently “‘resolved Guam’s liability’” for thedump. Id., at 114–117 (brackets omitted). But because the2004 decree had triggered the since-expired 3-year statute oflimitations for contribution actions, Guam had no remedy at all.Id., at 107, 117; see also §113(g)(3). We grantedcertiorari. 592 U.S. ___ (2021).IIGuam now attacks two links in this chain ofreasoning: First, Guam retreats from its complaint and argues thatit never had a viable contribution claim under§113(f), leaving it free to pursue a cost-recovery actionunder §107(a). The reason, argues Guam, is that a contributionclaim arises only if a settlement resolves liability under CERCLA,and not under some other law such as the Clean Water Act. Second,Guam contends that even if resolution of a non-CERCLA liability isenough, the decree did not adequately “resolve” any sort ofliability because Guam did not formally admit responsibility andbecause the agreement left Guam open to future enforcementaction.We need only address the first point to decidethis case.[2] A settlement mustresolve a CERCLA liability to trigger a contribution action under§113(f)(3)(B).Our analysis focuses on the totality ofsubsection 113(f), which governs the scope of a“contribution” claim under CERCLA. This subsection begins with ananchor provision—entitled “contribution”—that allows “[a]ny person[to] seek contribution from any other person who is liable orpotentially liable under section [1]07(a) of [CERCLA], during orfollowing any civil action under section [1]06 of [CERCLA] or undersection [1]07(a) of [CERCLA].” §113(f)(1). It next describeshow parties can insulate themselves from contribution, explainingthat “[a] person who has resolved its liability to the UnitedStates or a State in an administrative or judicially approvedsettlement shall not be liable for claims for contributionregarding matters addressed in the settlement.” §113(f)(2).And finally, it discusses the treatment of “[p]ersons not party to[a] settlement.” §113(f)(3). Most relevant here, “[a] personwho has resolved its liability to the United States ...for some or all of a response action or for some or all of thecosts of such action in an administrative or judicially approvedsettlement may seek contribution from any person who is not partyto a settlement referred to in [§113(f)(2)].”§113(f)(3)(B).That this subsection centers on and is entitled“contribution” is the first clue that it is concerned only with thedistribution of CERCLA liability. A contribution suit does notexist in a vacuum, but rather is a tool for apportioning theburdens of a predicate “common liability” among the responsibleparties. United States v. Atlantic Research Corp.,551 U.S.128, 138–139 (2007); see also Northwest Airlines, Inc.v. Transport Workers, 451 U.S.77, 86–87 (1981). The most obvious place to look for thatthreshold liability is CERCLA’s reticulated statutory matrix ofenvironmental duties and liabilities. Cf. Burlington N. & S.F.R.Co. v. United States, 556 U.S.599, 610 (2009) (“[Section 107(a)(3)] liability may not extendbeyond the limits of the statute itself”). After all,“[s]tatutes must ‘be read as a whole,’” AtlanticResearch, 551 U.S., at 135—an especially salient approachin this case given that CERCLA’s very title reinforces that it is a“Comprehensive” Act.Remaining within the bounds of CERCLA is alsoconsistent with the familiar principle that a federal contributionaction is virtually always a creature of a specific statutoryregime. See Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S., at 90–91,95–97 (noting a “narrow exception” for admiralty cases). In fact,there is no “general federal right to contribution” whatsoever.Id., at 96; cf. Middlesex County Sewerage Authorityv. National Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U.S.1, 13–15 (1981) (refusing to “assum[e] that Congress intendedto authorize by implication additional judicial remedies forprivate citizens suing under [two environmental statutes]”). Thatmodest understanding is difficult to reconcile with the UnitedStates’ invitation to treat §113(f)(3)(B) as a free-rovingcontribution right for a host of environmental liabilities arisingunder other laws.The interlocking language and structure of therelevant text confirm this understanding. The provision at issuehere—§113(f)(3)(B)—recognizes a statutory right tocontribution in the specific circ*mstance where a person “hasresolved its liability” via “settlement.” But as explained above,this entitlement to postsettlement contribution does not standalone. On the contrary, §113(f)(3)(B) exists within“‘the specific context’” of subsection (f), whichoutlines the broader workings of CERCLA contribution. MeritManagement Group, LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc., 583U.S. ___, ___ (2018) (slip op., at 11).This §113(f) family of contributionprovisions anticipates a predicate CERCLA liability, especiallywhen properly read in “sequenc[e]” as “‘integral parts of awhole.’” New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 586U.S. ___, ___ (2019) (slip op., at 4); see also CooperIndustries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc., 543 U.S.157, 167 (2004) (looking to “the whole of §113”). The§113(f)(1) anchor provision is especially clear on thispoint, allowing contribution “during or following any civil actionunder §[1]06 of this title or under §[1]07 of this title.” See alsoid., at 166 (“The natural meaning of [§113(f)(1)] isthat contribution may only be sought ... ‘during orfollowing’ a specified civil action”). And though §§113(f)(2)and 113(f)(3) are not quite as explicit, their phrasing andcontext still presume that a CERCLA liability is necessary totrigger contribution.Section 113(f)(2), for example, explainsthat a settlement by one party “does not discharge any of the otherpotentially liable persons unless its terms so provide.”(Emphasis added.) The highlighted phrase is a “natural referent” tothe text of the anchor provision, United States v.Briggs, 592 U.S. ___, ___ (2020) (slip op., at 3),which creates a CERCLA-specific contribution right against “anyother person who is liable or potentially liable under§[1]07 of [CERCLA],” §113(f)(1) (emphasis added).Section 113(f)(3)(B)—the provision atissue here—also has language that is best “understood only withreference” to the CERCLA regime. Atlantic Research, 551U.S., at 135; see also Sturgeon v. Frost, 577U.S. 424, 438 (2016). The provision’s final clause explains thatcontribution is available “from any person who is not party to asettlement referred to in [§113(f)(2)].” As discussed above,§113(f)(2) in turn mirrors the §113(f)(1) anchorprovision that requires a predicate CERCLA liability. Section113(f)(3)(B)’s opening clause separately ties itself to theCERCLA regime by permitting contribution after a party “hasresolved its liability ... for some or all of aresponse action or for some or all of the costs of suchaction.” (Emphasis added.) Not only does the anchor provisionalso discuss allocation of “response costs,” §113(f)(1), butthe phrase “response action” is a familiar CERCLA phrase thatappears dozens of times throughout the Act. E.g., §101 (12appearances); §107 (17 appearances).To be sure, as the Government points out,remedial measures that a party takes under another environmentalstatute might resemble steps taken in a formal CERCLA “responseaction.” But relying on that functional overlap to reinterpret thephrase “resolved its liability ... for some or all of aresponse action” to mean “settled an environmental liability thatmight have been actionable under CERCLA” would stretch the statutebeyond Congress’ actual language.Perhaps more important, the Government’sinterpretation would place undue stress on the word “resolve.” Thisterm conveys certainty and finality. See Webster’s Third NewInternational Dictionary 1933 (1986) (“make clear or certain”);American Heritage Dictionary 1107 (1981) (“remove or dispel(doubts); ... bring to a conclusion”).[3] It would be rather odd to say that a partyhas “resolved its liability” if that party remains vulnerable to aCERCLA suit. All the more so given that it will not always be clearwhether the substance of a prior environmental settlement wassufficiently similar to a quasi-CERCLA “response action.” As eventhe Government admits, “‘response action’ is, indeed, a broadterm, [but] it is not an unlimited term [that covers] everythingunder the sun.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 39–40; cf. 950 F.3d, at 116(comparing Guam’s obligations under the Clean Water Act decree toCERCLA’s “definition of a ‘remedial action’”). Rather thanrequiring parties and courts to estimate whether a prior settlementwas close enough to CERCLA, the far simpler approach is to askwhether a settlement expressly discharged a CERCLAliability.[4]No more persuasive are the United States’efforts to emphasize the differences among §113(f)’sprovisions. The Government observes that §113(f)(3)(B)—unlikethe §113(f)(1) anchor provision—does not expressly demand apredicate CERCLA action. That distinction, so the argument goes,implies that a broader range of environmental liabilities cantrigger §113(f)(3)(B). See Russello v. UnitedStates, 464 U.S.16, 23 (1983) (“‘[W]here Congress includes particularlanguage in one section of a statute but omits it in anothersection of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congressacts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion orexclusion’”). But this effort to tear §113(f)(3)(B)away from its companions based on a negative implication falters inlight of the other strong textual links among them. See Marxv. General Revenue Corp., 568 U.S.371, 381 (2013); Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper,Inc., 556 U.S.208, 222 (2009). Section 113(f)(3)(B)’s use of thefamiliar phrase “response action,” express cross-reference toanother CERCLA provision, and placement in the statutory schemeprevent us from so easily severing it from the larger Act.Similarly unavailing is the Government’s theorythat a tightly unified interpretation of these provisions wouldcreate surplusage problems. The United States argues, for example,that a reading of §113(f)(3)(B) that does nothing more thanallow a party to seek contribution after settling a CERCLAliability would be redundant with §113(f)(1), which alreadypermits contribution “during or following any civil action under[§§106 and 107].” But there is legitimate reason for separateprovisions, even if both allow contribution only for a CERCLAliability. For example, §113(f)(3)(B) specifies theconsequences of a particular type of resolution (i.e.,settlement), explaining that an “administrative or judiciallyapproved settlement” is sufficient and reinforcing that acontribution claim will not extend to parties who have alreadysettled. This sort of belt-and-suspenders approach hardly compelsan all-encompassing reading of §113(f)(3)(B). Cf. RiminiStreet, Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc., 586 U.S. ___,___ (2019) (slip op., at 11) (“We have recognized that someredundancy is hardly unusual in statutes addressing costs”(internal quotation marks omitted)). Rather than try “to avoidsurplusage at all costs,” Atlantic Research, 551 U.S.,at 137, we interpret §113(f)(3)(B) in light of its text andplace within a comprehensive statutory scheme.*  *  *The most natural reading of§113(f)(3)(B) is that a party may seek contribution underCERCLA only after settling a CERCLA-specific liability. We thusreverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the casefor further proceedings consistent with this opinion.It is so ordered.